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The (Ir)relevance of Investing in Citizen Engagement for Development Cooperation

Evidence from 23 European Countries

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Key insights at a glance

Citizen engagement once occupied a central place in international development cooperation. Informing and engaging citizens was embedded in policy, programming and funding of so-called donor countries, and was widely understood as part of the responsibility of development cooperation itself. Over time, however, to different extents, citizen engagement appears to have gradually lost its prominence in development cooperation in many countries.

Today, this declining prominence coincides with a context in which political support for development cooperation is under increasing pressure in several donor countries, while societal support can no longer simply be taken for granted either. Precisely in this context, we see renewed interest in the role of citizens and in how they are informed about and engaged in development cooperation.

This renewed attention brings back longstanding questions: Do political commitment, investment in citizen engagement, and societal support form a mutually reinforcing relationship? And, more broadly: does it matter to invest in citizen engagement, and how is such investment related to societal support for development cooperation?

This study puts these longstanding questions in the spotlight by examining them through longitudinal comparative data across 23 European countries, for the period 1987-2023. Rather than focusing on individual citizen engagement interventions or developments within a single country, we bring together developments in ODA spending, investment in development awareness, and public attitudes across countries and over time. This allows us to examine whether the relationships that have long been assumed between political commitment, citizen engagement, and societal support are actually visible in practice, how consistent they are across countries, and how they have developed over time.

The findings show a considerably more complex picture: political commitment to development cooperation, investment in engaging citizens, and societal support are related, but they are distinct and do not consistently move together.

- **Investment in engaging citizens has lost ground**, while over time political commitment to development cooperation (ODA budget) has been considerably more stable. For the 23 countries that participated in our study, average development awareness spending per capita fell by **51% between 2009 and 2023**. The two therefore do not simply develop in parallel.
- **Societal support has changed but has not simply disappeared**. Support for development cooperation remains considerable, but has become less pronounced, with a shift from stronger towards more moderate expressions of support.
- **Greater political commitment does not automatically go together with greater investment in citizen engagement.** ODA and awareness spending are positively related overall, but this relationship differs considerably between countries and over time. Investment in engaging citizens therefore appears to be a policy choice in its own right rather than simply a reflection of the size of a country's ODA budget.
- **Neither greater political commitment nor greater investment in citizen engagement consistently goes together with stronger societal support.** Across countries, the relationships between ODA and public support and between awareness spending and public support are weak. Within individual countries, these relationships vary considerably in both strength and direction: in some countries, higher investment even coincides with lower levels of public support, contrary to what might be expected.
- **Similar levels of societal support can be found under very different conditions.** Some countries combine relatively high levels of investment with high public support, while others maintain similarly high levels of support with considerably lower investment. Even countries that look similar in terms of their overall levels of investment and support can show very different relationships between these dimensions over time.

Taken together, the findings show that there is no single European pathway connecting political commitment, citizen engagement and societal support. The relationships between these dimensions differ considerably between countries and over time, and in some cases even run in directions contrary to what might be expected. Neither ODA spending nor investment in development awareness alone is sufficient to explain differences or changes in public support.

The findings show that the outcomes of citizen engagement are less predictable than we often hope. This reinforces the need to be cautious about treating citizen engagement as a predictable instrument for producing particular attitudes or forms of support. Instead, building on the findings, we suggest bringing the *why* of citizen engagement back to the centre. The findings invite us to (re)consider investment in citizen engagement as a responsibility in its own right: creating space for citizens to be informed, question, contribute to, and help shape development cooperation. This means recognising citizen engagement as part of the core responsibilities of civil society organisations and governments, linked to their role in shaping and carrying out development cooperation. Such engagement may contribute to greater understanding, solidarity and support, and these remain important outcomes to work towards and monitor for, but they cannot be assumed or guaranteed. Recognising citizen engagement as part of the core responsibilities of development cooperation becomes particularly important at a time when both the *why* and the *how* of development cooperation are changing rapidly and citizens need space not only to be informed about these changes, but also to question, contribute to and help shape them.

1. Introduction

With a few exceptions, political support for development cooperation is under increasing pressure across many so-called donor countries. At the same time, recent studies suggest that societal support for development cooperation can no longer simply be taken for granted either. In response to this, we see renewed interest in the role of citizens and how they are informed about and engaged in development cooperation (Development Studies Association, 2025; OECD, 2025). The underlying study began with the observation, through research activities and dialogues with a diversity of development actors in a diverse number of donor countries, that the importance of citizen engagement within development cooperation has shifted from what once was being considered 'core business' to a much more marginal position in development policy and practice.

The study is guided by two questions. First, how has investment in citizen engagement evolved? Second, do political commitment, investment in citizen engagement, and societal support form a mutually reinforcing relationship? More broadly, we aim to shed light on the question: does it matter to invest in citizen engagement?

We first, as part of this introduction, trace how citizen engagement became embedded in development cooperation policy and how its position has changed over time. We then arrive at the core of the study and examine developments across 23 European Official Development Assistance (ODA)-providing countries, bringing together three dimensions: ODA expenditure as an indicator of political commitment to development cooperation; expenditure on Development Awareness as an indicator of investment in citizen engagement; and public attitudes towards development cooperation as an indicator of societal support. The analysis proceeds in three steps: first, we examine how each of these dimensions has developed over time; second, we explore how they relate to one another across countries; and third, for the countries for which sufficient longitudinal data are available, we examine whether changes within countries over time move together[1].

A historical perspective on citizen engagement

For many decades, citizens in donor countries in the Global North were considered a key stakeholder in development cooperation. Informing and engaging citizens was considered a core part of development cooperation. Already in the early 1960s, the importance of public support was recognised within the emerging international development cooperation system. In its first annual report in 1962, the OECD Development Assistance Committee called for "fresh initiatives" to secure public support for expanding development aid programmes. It was concluded that the needs in developing countries exceeded the then available flow of resources. Increased public support was considered conditional for increasing aid budgets (Führer, 1994).

In 1970, the UN's International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade described the "mobilization of public opinion" as an "essential part" of the objectives and policies of the Decade (United Nations General Assembly, 1970). The rationale went beyond seeing public support merely as a means of sustaining or increasing development budgets: citizens in developed countries needed to understand the interdependent nature of development efforts, the benefits they themselves derived from international cooperation, the efforts developing countries were making, and the need to support their economic and social progress. In developing countries, citizens were likewise to be made aware of the "benefits and sacrifices" involved and encouraged to participate fully in achieving the objectives of the Decade. According to the UN, responsibility for mobilising public opinion was to lie primarily with national bodies, with governments encouraged to establish such bodies or strengthen existing ones, while also giving increasing development orientation to educational curricula (United Nations General Assembly, 1970).

[1] We thank our colleague Luuk van Kempen for his critical review of our study. The study was co-funded by Wilde Ganzen Foundation.

The emphasis on public understanding continued within the donor community in the following decades. In 1973, the OECD Development Assistance Committee called on its members to promote a better understanding of development problems and the progress being made (Martin, 1973). By the 1990s, the debate increasingly focused not only on informing the public, but also on the relationship between knowledge, public attitudes and actual support for development cooperation (Foy & Helmich, 1996; Smillie & Helmich, 1998). The importance attached to this was also reflected in the "UNESCO's 1974 Recommendation on education for international understanding, cooperation and peace" which called for education to foster a global perspective, awareness of interdependence, and international solidarity and cooperation (UNESCO, 1974).

This continued commitment was also increasingly translated into financial terms. In its *Human Development Report 1993*, UNDP suggested that "as much as 3% of aid funds could be earmarked for spending within donor countries to prepare public opinion for the post-Cold War context and increase awareness of North–South interdependence" (UNDP, 1993). A year later, the *Human Development Report 1994* proposed that "a small proportion of aid - say 2% - could be earmarked to cultivate public support through better communication about the objectives of aid and development cooperation". Importantly, this was explicitly framed "not as an attempt to manipulate public opinion, but as part of the accountability of development cooperation to citizens" (UNDP, 1994).

The commitment was renewed in Europe in 2005. The *European Conference on Public Awareness and Development Education for North-South Solidarity* proposed that the European Commission and Member States should "move towards or beyond" 3% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget for development education and awareness raising (European Conference on Public Awareness and Development Education for North-South Solidarity, 2005). The same year, the *European Consensus on Development* committed the EU to paying particular attention to development education and awareness raising among European citizens (Council of the European Union et al., 2006). The 2005 recommendation was subsequently taken up in European advocacy and policy and further embedded in the 2007 *European Consensus on Development: The Contribution of Development Education & Awareness Raising*, which provided a common framework for development education and awareness raising across Europe (Caserta, 2005; European Multi-Stakeholder Steering Group on Development Education, 2007).

Citizen engagement did not disappear after the mid-2000s. During both the Millennium Development Goal and Sustainable Development Goal eras, development education, global education and, increasingly, Global Citizenship Education continued to provide an important framework for informing and engaging citizens. However, from the mid-2000s onwards, the OECD peer reviews increasingly point to declining funding, reduced policy prominence or weakened institutional attention to development awareness and education in a number of donor countries, including Austria, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland and Switzerland. At the same time, countries such as Belgium and Ireland continued to maintain comparatively strong commitments. Rather than an overall retreat, this suggests a gradual fragmentation of what had earlier been considered as a more broadly shared ambition within development cooperation.

Taken together, these developments point to a remarkably sustained historical understanding of citizen engagement as more than "an optional communications activity" but as core business.

Citizen engagement today

Seen against this history, the contemporary position of citizen engagement as a policy priority is striking. A responsibility once treated as part of the core infrastructure of development cooperation seems, in many countries, to have gradually lost its prominence in policy, programming and funding.

As also mentioned above, the importance attached to citizen engagement has not disappeared altogether. Actors working specifically on development education and Global Citizenship Education continue to frame it as essential and still invoke the 3% benchmark in their advocacy (see, for example, IDEA, 2025; CONCORD, 2024; ChildFund Alliance & Educo, 2025). However, in development cooperation more broadly, citizen engagement appears to have become far less prominent in policy, programming and financing than it was in earlier decades.

OECD data point in the same direction: spending reported by DAC members on the "promotion of development awareness" declined from 0.36% of ODA in 2018 to 0.20% in 2023 (OECD, 2025), far below the earlier 2–3% ambitions. While these earlier figures were recommendations rather than levels necessarily achieved in practice, the contrast suggests that citizen engagement occupies a considerably less prominent position in the financing of development cooperation today than the ambitions of earlier decades would imply.

At the same time, the wider societal context in which citizen engagement takes place has also changed considerably. Societal support appears increasingly contested in several donor countries. Recent comparative research shows declining public support for maintaining or increasing aid budgets in France, Germany and the United Kingdom since 2020, although levels and trends differ between countries (Development Engagement Lab, 2025; OECD, 2025; Schneider et al., 2025). The 2026 Clingendael Barometer describes Dutch attitudes towards development cooperation as moderately positive but strongly divided, while finding greater support when cooperation is framed around strategic partnerships and Dutch interests (De Bruijne et al., 2026). When it comes to recent budget cuts in development cooperation, studies point to a mixed picture: the Dutch public is almost evenly divided (Kinsbergen, Müller and Sneijers, 2025). In Belgium, the 2026 Barometer of International Solidarity found that 38% supported the government's decision to cut the development cooperation budget by a quarter, while 27% opposed it and 35% were undecided. Support for increasing Belgian aid to the international target of 0.7% of GNI stood at 35%, its lowest level since 2021 (CNCD-11.11.11, 2026). A large majority in Switzerland prefers spending to remain stable or increase (ETH Zurich/NADEL, 2025), and across 34 countries, majorities supported reversing cuts or increasing aid after being informed about their estimated human consequences (Rockefeller Foundation and Focaldata, 2026).

Overall, while these and other studies show no overall deterioration of citizen support, they do show signs of more critical perceptions from citizens towards development cooperation that gained in prominence through time.

It is against this background of a period of declining prominence of citizen engagement as a policy priority, and a more contested environment for development cooperation — that renewed attention to citizens becomes particularly noteworthy.

The case for Citizen Engagement

This renewed interest in Citizen Engagement also brings back questions that have long surrounded the field of citizen engagement: what difference does it make? Does greater understanding translate into different attitudes and, ultimately, different forms of engagement?

Today, activities aimed at citizen engagement are commonly referred to as Development Education and Awareness Raising or Global Citizenship Education. They can include efforts to inform citizens about global development issues and development cooperation, raise awareness and encourage active engagement. The specific form these activities take can vary considerably, as can their target groups: from school-based programmes for children and young people, to public campaigns, community activities, media initiatives and forms of engagement aimed at broader adult audiences.

Whatever terminology is used, and whatever shape these activities take, they share an underlying assumption that informing and engaging citizens matters for how people understand, relate to and potentially act upon issues of international development and cooperation.

Said differently: greater investment in citizen engagement is expected to contribute to better understanding, more positive attitudes towards development cooperation, and greater engagement with development issues.

In addition, citizen engagement activities suggest a potentially reinforcing relationship between political commitment to development cooperation (ODA budget), investment in engaging citizens and societal support for development cooperation. Countries with greater political commitment might be expected to invest more in engaging their citizens, while such engagement might, in turn, be expected to contribute to stronger societal support. Stronger societal support could, in turn, provide a more favourable environment for sustained political commitment.

This idea is not new. More than twenty years ago, McDonnell et al. (2003) examined public opinion, global education and development cooperation across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) countries in search of what they termed a "virtuous circle". They found that public support for helping poorer countries was generally high, while citizens' knowledge and understanding of development issues and development cooperation remained limited. They also found the relationship between public support and Official Development Assistance (ODA) levels to be complex. Their study argued for greater investment in global education and awareness raising as a way of developing a better informed and more critically engaged public. At the same time, they identified an important evidence gap: there was insufficient evidence to establish what effect such investments actually had on public opinion.

More than two decades later, this question remains relevant. Development cooperation now operates in a different and increasingly contested political and societal context, while the ways in which governments and other actors inform and engage citizens have also changed.

The relationship between citizen engagement and public support is far from straightforward. Research has repeatedly shown that citizens often have limited knowledge of development cooperation, overestimate the amount governments spend on foreign aid, and express concerns that aid is wasted or ends up in the wrong hands (e.g. Smillie & Helmich, 1998; Munnelly & Pfitzner, 2025). Such perceptions matter because they can shape attitudes towards development cooperation. Studies also point to mismatches between citizens' views on how development cooperation should be approached and the approaches taken by the sector itself (Hennessy et al., 2025; Munnelly & Pfitzner, 2025). This has led to renewed calls for better communication with and engagement of citizens (Hennessy et al., 2025).

More recent research provides further evidence that information matters, but not necessarily in one direction. Heinzel, Reinsberg and Swedlund (2025) find that informing British citizens about the transparency of the UK's aid agency increases support for aid through that agency, with particularly strong effects among those initially more sceptical of aid. Their cross-national analysis also finds a positive association between aid-agency transparency and public support across 22 European countries. Reinsberg and Swedlund (2026), however, find that information about the misuse of foreign aid reduces support among British citizens, and that this negative response extends beyond the particular recipient country in which misuse occurred. The recent 34-country survey by the Rockefeller Foundation and Focaldata (see also above) provides another indication of the importance of information: after respondents were informed about estimates of the possible mortality consequences of recent aid cuts, majorities in all countries favoured reversing those cuts or increasing aid (Rockefeller Foundation and Focaldata, 2026). What citizens learn about development cooperation can therefore strengthen as well as weaken support.

Yet assessing whether citizen engagement actually makes a difference is notoriously difficult (IOB, 2009). Previous research has examined, among other things, associations between public support and countries' ODA levels (Grevinga, 2022), as well as the relationship between other societal and political developments and attitudes towards development cooperation. The recent studies discussed above show that public attitudes can respond to information, but they do not tell us whether broader and sustained investment in citizen engagement translates into stronger societal support at country level.

Rather than attempting to establish the effectiveness of individual interventions, this study takes a step back and examines whether broader patterns can be identified across countries and over time. In doing so, we are revisiting an unresolved relationship identified more than twenty years ago, now using longitudinal comparative data to examine whether the expected relationships are actually visible across countries and over time.

We bring together three dimensions: ODA expenditure, as an indicator of political commitment to development cooperation; investment in Development Awareness, as an indicator of investment in informing and engaging citizens; and public attitudes towards development cooperation, as an indicator of societal support.

To answer this question, we build up our analysis in three steps. First, we examine how each of these three dimensions has developed over time: how has ODA spending developed, what has happened to investment in development awareness, and how has public support changed? Second, we examine how these dimensions come together across countries: do countries with stronger political commitment also invest more in citizen engagement, and do countries that invest more also show stronger societal support? Third, we examine whether these relationships hold within countries over time: when ODA or awareness spending changes, does public support move with it?

The report therefore has two related aims. First, we map the development of ODA expenditure, investment in Development Awareness and public attitudes towards development cooperation across a diverse group of European ODA-providing countries, placing current developments in a longer-term perspective. Second, we explore the relationships between these dimensions, with particular attention to whether differences and changes in investment in citizen engagement are associated with differences and changes in public support for development cooperation across countries and over time.

The aim is not to establish whether citizen engagement causes public support. Rather, by bringing these three dimensions together, we examine whether the expected relationships between political commitment, investment in citizen engagement and societal support are visible in the data, how consistent these relationships are across countries and over time, and what this can tell us about the question at the heart of this study: does it matter to invest in citizen engagement?

2. Methodology

2.1. Data collection

As mentioned in the previous section, our dataset consists of three variables: Development awareness spending, Public opinion on development cooperation, and (national) ODA budgets.

2.1.1. Development awareness spending per capita

According to OECD DAC, development awareness spending refers to "Funding of activities designed to increase public support, i.e. awareness in the donor country of development co-operation efforts, needs and issues. [It] includes the funding of special lectures or curricula and provision of information about the national aid programme. Excludes country-specific or product-specific announcements and publicity or informational expenditures for which enhanced public support for development is an incidental consequence, rather than a principal objective" (OECD, 2024).

For our analysis, we used the data from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) from 1987 to 2023. The original variable in the database was available in constant prices, in millions of US dollars. Since our dataset consists of diverse countries, we decided to convert the variables to a per-capita measure by dividing it by population numbers published by the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).

2.1.2. ODA as a percentage of GNI

The second variable in our dataset is Official Development Assistance (ODA, disbursements, gross in million US dollars), also downloaded from the OECD DAC CRS from 1984 to 2024. To make the data comparable, we converted it into percentages of Gross National Income (GNI) using GNI data from the World Bank's WDI database.

2.1.3. Public opinion on development cooperation

For public opinion data, we have looked into published Eurobarometer reports on development cooperation. Eurobarometer surveys collect public opinion on a variety of social, political and economic issues across EU member states. These surveys aim to provide comparable information on citizens' attitudes and perceptions across countries and over time.

The survey question that we focused on, as a proxy for opinion about development cooperation, is: "In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in developing countries?"[2]

The survey is conducted every three to five years, so unlike the previous two variables, no continuous time series is available for this indicator. Therefore, we extracted data for the following years: 1987, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2009, 2011, 2014, and 2019. However, due to inconsistencies in the response options in the survey from 1987, we have chosen to exclude this year from our analysis. Similarly, the amount of data for the years 1991, 1996, and 2002 was very limited, with a lot of missing values. As a result, these years were also omitted for the second part of the report (see Table 2). For the descriptive part, we have three groups in importance: 'important', referring to the percentage of people who have responded 'very important' to the question; 'fairly important', which is the percentage of people who have responded 'important' (in 1991 and 1996) or 'fairly important' (from 2002 onwards) to this question; and 'not important', which is the percentage of people who have responded 'not very important' or 'not important' to this question. Respondents who answered 'Don't know' were not taken into account for the analysis.

2.2. Country selection

We started with a selection of 26 European countries for this study, aiming to ensure a broad and diverse representation of countries. Three of these countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) were dropped because of a lack of data for the Eurobarometer. The focus on Europe, as well as the specific countries included, was largely driven by practical considerations related to data availability. For part two of the report, only countries that had at least 5 data points for all three variables were included. This means that of the 26 countries in our dataset, twelve countries (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, France, Greece, Poland and Slovenia) were excluded from that part. An overview of missing observations by country and indicator is provided in Annex A.

To better identify and understand patterns, countries were grouped based on geographical location (North, South, East and West; see Table 1).

Table 1: Countries by region

Region	Countries
West (9 countries)	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
East (7 countries)	Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
North (5 countries)	Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
South (5 countries)	Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain

[2] Over the years, the wording of the question has varied a bit. In the earlier years, the question was formulated as "In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important or not at all important to help the people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?"

2.3. Data analysis

As explained earlier, the data analysis has been conducted in two parts. We explain our data analysis strategy for the two parts as follows:

Part I: Exploring patterns

In the first part, using descriptive statistics including graphs and grouping across countries, we have analysed how each variable has evolved. Here we have used complete time series data from 1987 to 2024 for the variables where possible (see Table 2 for details).

This analysis has allowed us to understand the trends in the field of development cooperation over time, both from the government's side and from the public's perspective. We then bring the three variables together to explore the relationships between them and identify different country configurations. For the latter, we use standardised K-means clustering in R3.

Part II: Analysing relationships

As a second step, we analyse the relationships between the three variables more systematically using Pearson correlation analysis and a subsequent classification of country-level correlations by their strength and direction. Although some studies find direct effects of citizen engagement interventions (e.g., Eger et al., 2023), others conceptualise citizen engagement as a process that unfolds over time (Hudson et al., 2020). From a theoretical perspective, we would therefore ideally examine both contemporaneous and lagged (n+1) relationships between awareness spending and public opinion. However, the available data do not allow for a sufficiently robust analysis of lagged relationships: the number of observations is small, and the time intervals between subsequent measurement points vary considerably. We therefore focus our main analysis on correlations between awareness spending and public opinion measured in the same year. We present the findings of the lagged effect analysis in Annex E but, given the above, they should be interpreted with considerable caution.

It is also important to highlight that the number of observations changes between Part I and II. For the second part, we limited the data points to the survey years, since these are the only years with data for all three variables for a full analysis (see Table 2).

Table 2: Time Period used for each variable

Variable name	Time period
Part I	
Awareness spending	1987 – 2023
ODA as a percentage of GNI	1987 – 2024
Public opinion	1991, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2019
Part II	
Awareness spending	2004, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2019
ODA as a percentage of GNI	2004, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2019
Public opinion	2004, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2019

[3] For the country typology, we used K-means clustering. This is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm that looks for patterns in the data and divides it into a set of K groups. The clustering is based on country averages for the three variables across the years included in the analysis (1987–2024). As the variables are measured on different scales, they were standardised prior to clustering. We tested both random and non-random clustering and explored solutions with three, four and five clusters (K=3–5). As these alternative specifications did not produce meaningful differences in the overall findings, we selected the standardised random K=3 solution, which provided the most interpretable grouping of countries.

2.4. Limitations of the study

This study did not come without methodological complications. We worked with publicly available data from different sources that were not originally collected with the intention of being combined. This allowed us to bring together information on ODA spending, investment in development awareness and public support across a relatively large number of European countries and over an extended period, but it also placed clear boundaries on the analysis. We had to work with the years for which comparable data were available, with the indicators included in the respective datasets, and with changes in these data over time.

This was particularly relevant for the Eurobarometer data: questions were not asked every year, some questions disappeared from the survey over time, and answer categories changed. These changes limited which questions and years could be meaningfully compared and, ultimately, determined the public opinion indicator used in the analysis.

As a result, while the data on ODA and development awareness spending cover a relatively long period, the analysis of the relationships between ODA spending, awareness spending and public support in Part II ends in 2019. This limits how up-to-date the findings are, particularly given the considerable changes in the political and societal context of development cooperation since then. At the same time, the purpose of this part of the study is not primarily to describe the situation today, but to examine more general patterns in how the three indicators relate to one another across countries and over time. We therefore consider the patterns identified in the analysis to remain relevant, while recognising that more recent data are needed to establish whether these relationships have changed since 2019.

The available data also determined what we could measure. The Eurobarometer questions provide a useful indication of the importance citizens attach to development cooperation but capture only one dimension of public support that fits the purpose of this study[4]. Similarly, expenditure on development awareness tells us how much is invested, but not what this investment consists of. It does not tell us what kinds of activities were funded, what their objectives were, how many or which citizens were reached, or the intensity and quality of their engagement. This is particularly relevant because the meaning and objectives of development education and awareness raising may differ between countries and may have changed over time. A weak relationship between spending and the particular measure of public support used in this study can therefore not in itself be interpreted as evidence that awareness raising is ineffective.

A further limitation concerns the number and timing of observations. Because comparable public opinion data were available only for a limited number of years, the country-level analyses are based on relatively few observations, with sometimes considerable intervals between them. This limits the robustness of the country-level correlations and makes it difficult to determine over what period changes in investment might be reflected in public attitudes. We explored lagged relationships, but these should be interpreted with particular caution for the same reason.

Most importantly, this study does not allow us to establish causal relationships between ODA spending, awareness spending and public support. The correlations show whether these variables move together, but they cannot tell us whether a change in one causes a change in another. A positive relationship between awareness spending and public support, for example, cannot be taken as evidence that higher spending produces greater public support. The relationship could also work in the opposite direction, or both could be shaped by other political, economic and societal developments. Our findings therefore identify patterns and relationships that require further explanation; they do not demonstrate effects.

[4] Eurobarometer has different questions related to people's attitude in relation to development cooperation, but these were found less fitting for the purpose of this study.

Part I: Patterns in ODA spending, awareness spending and public support

3.1 Development awareness spending per capita

The overall average development awareness spending per capita across European countries increased substantially between 1987 and 2002, rising by 302% over this period, as shown in Figure 1. This increase should be interpreted with some caution, as the composition of the dataset changed over time: several Eastern European countries only started reporting awareness spending data in the early 2000s, which affected the European averages (For comparison, Figure B.1 in Annex B presents the awareness-spending trend for a restricted set of countries). Nevertheless, the data show that the upward trend was not merely the result of changes in country coverage but reflected a genuine increase in awareness spending across European countries.



Figure 1: Average development awareness spending per capita

After a period of slight fluctuation between 2002 and 2006, average spending began to decline in 2007, with the decline becoming more pronounced after 2009. Between 2009 and 2023, average spending fell from USD 1.74 to USD 0.85 per capita, a decline of 51%. However, spending varies greatly between countries, with Luxembourg spending USD 6.83 per capita compared with just USD 0.014 in the Netherlands.

These findings can also be read in light of the historical funding benchmarks discussed in the introduction. Whereas 2–3% of the ODA budget was proposed in the 1990s for development awareness spending, actual spending in our sample was substantially lower: 0.54% of combined ODA in 2004 and 0.27% in 2023 among the 15 countries with comparable data[5].

[5] The 15 countries with comparable development awareness and ODA data for both 2004 and 2023 are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

3.1.1. Regional level



Figure 2: Average development awareness spending per capita per region

When assessing the average awareness spending per region, Figure 2 shows that overall, Northern European countries spent the most on development awareness, although Western European countries have also caught up with them in the past five years. The trend of Western and Northern countries has been similar to the overall averages seen in Figure 1, with Norway (from the Northern group) and Luxembourg (from the Western group) being in the lead for per capita spending (Country-level trends are presented in Annex C, Figures C.1–C.4).

On the other hand, the pattern for Southern European countries is slightly different, with an upward trend between 2004 and 2011. For this group, Spain spends the most on development awareness.

Finally, Eastern European countries started reporting their development awareness spending in the early 2000s when they became part of the DAC. From 2013 onwards, more than one country has been included in the average for Eastern European countries (see Annex Figure C.4), which is why the pattern is visible from that year on. In the Eastern region, in general, Estonia and the Czech Republic tend to spend the most on development awareness.

3.2 ODA spending

Across the countries in our sample, average ODA remained below the envisioned 0.7% of GNI throughout the period (OECD.org). There are some missing values in the data between 1984 and 2004, but from 2004 onwards, the data are complete[6]. Overall, average ODA spending in our sample of countries has ranged from 0.3% to 0.45% (see Figure 3). The only exception is 2022, when the average increased to 0.5%. This increase is likely related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which prompted many European countries to increase their development cooperation budget (OECD, 2026). After 2022, the average percentage fell back towards its previous level, reaching 0.42% in 2024.



Figure 3: Average ODA spending as % of GNI

3.2.1 Regional level

Overall, Northern European countries have the highest average ODA percentages, followed by Western European countries (see Figure 4). The trends across all four regions have been broadly similar, particularly since 2004, when the dataset is complete. Trends before 2004 should be interpreted with caution, as data are missing for several countries. Because these countries generally had lower ODA percentages, their absence results in higher regional averages[7].

[6] Figure B.2 in Annex B presents the corresponding ODA trend after excluding countries only included after 1998.
[7] Country-level trends are presented in Annex D (Figures D.1–D.4).



Figure 4: Average ODA spending as % of GNI per region

3.3 Opinions on development aid

When it comes to people's attitudes towards development cooperation, the most notable trend is the sharp decline in the share of people who consider development assistance "very important", from 51% in 2002 to 33% in 2019 (Figure 5). At the same time, the share considering it "fairly important" increased from 39% to 54%. This suggests a shift from strong or unequivocal support towards more moderate support for development cooperation. Alongside this shift, the share of people who considered development assistance "not important" also increased slightly, from 10% in 2002 to 15% in 2014. Overall, these trends suggest that while development cooperation continues to enjoy considerable public support, this support has become less pronounced over time.



Figure 5: Average percentages of people's opinions about the importance of development aid

3.3.1 Region

Zooming in on regional patterns (see Figures 6-8) reveals both persistent differences between regions and a broader shift in the strength of public support for development assistance. Northern Europe consistently shows the strongest support, while support is lowest in Eastern Europe. At the same time, across all regions, strong support has gradually shifted towards more moderate support.

This shift is most clearly visible in the declining share of respondents who consider development assistance "very important" and the corresponding increase in those who consider it "fairly important". In Eastern Europe, for example, the share considering development assistance "very important" fell from 37% in 2004 to 18% in 2019, while the share considering it "fairly important" increased from 48% to 64%. Northern Europe also experienced a substantial decline in strong support, from 65% to 51%, although it continued to record the highest level of strong support. Southern Europe similarly saw an increase in moderate support, while changes in Northern and Western Europe were more gradual.

A somewhat different regional pattern emerges among respondents who consider development assistance "not (very) important". Eastern Europe consistently records the highest share, which increased steadily before declining slightly in 2019. In Southern Europe, the share increased until 2011 but has declined since, with Western Europe following a broadly similar pattern. Northern Europe consistently records the lowest share of respondents who consider development assistance unimportant. Notably, in 2019, this share declined across all four regions compared with the previous survey year.

Overall, the regional data therefore point not simply to declining public support for development assistance, but to a shift in its intensity: unequivocal support has weakened, while more moderate support has become more common. This pattern is visible across regions, despite considerable differences in their overall levels of support.



Figure 6: Average percentage per region responding 'Not (very) important'



Figure 7: Average percentage per region responding 'Very important'



Figure 8: Average percentage per region responding 'Fairly important'

3.4 Bringing awareness spending and public opinion together

One of the central questions of this study is whether investment in citizen engagement is related to public support for development cooperation. As a first descriptive step, Figure 9 brings together the trends in awareness spending and public opinion presented in the previous sections. The figure is based on the broad set of countries included in Part I and therefore provides an overall picture of how these two dimensions have developed over time.

An interesting pattern emerges. The decline in awareness spending coincides with an increase in the share of people who consider development assistance “not important”, particularly between 2009 and 2014. At the same time, the decline in those considering development assistance “very important” is accompanied primarily by a rise in the share considering it “fairly important”. Taken together, the figure therefore shows that declining investment in awareness raising occurred alongside a weakening in the intensity of public support.

These parallel trends are noteworthy, but they do not tell us whether the two developments are related. The figure presents averages across countries and may conceal considerable differences between them.



Figure 9: Average awareness spending and opinion graphs combined

3.5 Country typology: different configurations of investment and support

Having examined the three dimensions separately and explored the relationships between them, we now consider how they come together at the country level. Do countries show distinct patterns in their levels of ODA spending, investment in awareness-raising, and public support for development cooperation? And do higher levels of spending on development cooperation and citizen engagement tend to coincide with higher levels of public support? To explore whether distinct country configurations can be identified, we use K-means clustering (see Methods for an explanation).

The analysis identifies three distinct groups of countries (Table 3). The first and smallest cluster—Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden—combines the highest levels of average ODA spending (0.85% of GNI) and average awareness spending (USD 2.97 per capita) with the highest level of average public support (0.928). The second and largest cluster shows a markedly different pattern. These countries spend on average considerably less on both ODA (0.20% of GNI) and awareness-raising (USD 0.39 per capita) and also record the lowest average level of public support (0.820).

The third cluster presents a more mixed—and potentially particularly interesting—picture. Average public support is almost as high as in the first cluster (0.915), despite considerably lower levels of both average awareness spending (USD 0.61 per capita) and average ODA spending (0.31% of GNI). This group therefore shows that high levels of public support do not necessarily coincide with equally high levels of spending on ODA and awareness raising.

The composition of the clusters also shows some geographical and economic patterns. Cluster 1 consists of two Northern and two Western European countries. Cluster 2 contains ten countries and is dominated by Eastern European countries.

Cluster 3 includes nine countries from across the regions, with Southern European countries particularly well represented, and consists exclusively of middle- and higher-GNI countries.

Table 3: Country clusters based on the three variables

K-means Clustering	**Mean overall importance**	**Mean awareness spending per capita**	**Mean ODA as percentage of GNI**	**Countries**
1. High investment, high support	0.928	2.97	0.85%	Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden
2. Low investment, low support	0.820	0.389	0.2%	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia
3. Moderate investment, high support	0.915	0.61	0.31%	Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom

Overall, the clustering suggests that the relationship between awareness spending and public support is not uniform across countries. While the first two clusters are consistent with a pattern in which higher investment in awareness raising coincides with higher public support, the third cluster complicates this picture: countries in this group achieve similarly high levels of public support despite considerably lower awareness spending. This suggests that other factors may shape how public support develops and is sustained across countries.

Part II: Analysing relationships between ODA spending, awareness spending and public support

Part I of this report examined how ODA spending, investment in development awareness and public support have developed across countries and over time. It also provided a first exploration of how these dimensions relate to one another and how they come together in different country configurations. In Part II, we take this analysis a step further by examining the strength and direction of the relationships between the three variables more systematically.

We do this in two steps. First, we examine these relationships across countries and time by pooling the observations across countries and years. Second, we examine how they play out within individual countries over time.

4.1 Relationships across countries and time

As a first step, we pool the observations across countries and years and calculate correlations between the three variables. This allows us to examine the overall strength and direction of the relationships between ODA spending, awareness spending, and public support across countries and time. To ensure the correlations were relatively reliable, we considered only countries with at least 5 observations for all three variables. This means that Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece, and Poland were dropped from the list. We calculated correlations for different combinations of the three variables, as shown in Table 4. The overall correlations show a moderate but positive relationship between ODA spending and awareness spending, i.e., as one increases, the other increases. On the other hand, a relatively weak and positive correlation can be observed for ODA spending and positive public opinion and between awareness spending and positive public opinion.

To test the hypothesis that changes in awareness spending or ODA may take time to affect public opinion, we also calculated lagged correlations. This means that we compared spending at one point in time with public opinion measured at the following survey. Even when considering a lagged effect of ODA or awareness spending on importance rates, only a weak positive correlation was observed (see Annex Table E.1a).[8]

Table 4: Overall correlations

Relationship	Correlation
ODA vs. Awareness	0.597
ODA vs. (Very) important	0.130
Awareness vs. (Very) important	0.198

4.2 Relationships within countries over time

The pooled correlations provide an overall picture of the relationships between the three variables across countries and time. However, these overall relationships may conceal important differences between countries. We therefore also calculated the correlations separately for individual countries to examine whether changes in ODA spending, awareness spending and public support move together within countries over time. The results show considerable variation in both the strength and direction of these relationships.

For the relationship between ODA and awareness spending, the country-level correlations show considerable variation (see Annex Table E.2). For Denmark (r = .912), Finland (r = .783), Germany (r = .986), the Netherlands (r = .736) and Spain (r = .810), the relationship between the two is relatively strong.

[8] Correlations for the separate public opinion categories are reported in Table E.1 in Annex E.

However, for Belgium (r = -.317), Portugal (r = -.386) and the United Kingdom (r = -.260), the relationship seems to move, though relatively weakly, in the opposite direction.

Furthermore, there are also countries where the relationship is only relatively weak in a positive direction, while for others, like Sweden (r = .008), no relationship can be observed. This shows that increases or decreases in ODA spending are not necessarily correlated with increases or decreases in awareness spending and that it is important to pay separate attention to awareness spending.

For the relationship between ODA spending and public support, the pooled analysis showed only a weak positive relationship. At the country level, however, there are again considerable differences (see Annex Table E.3). Germany is the only country showing a strong positive relationship between ODA and importance rates (r = .800), indicating that if the ODA budget goes up, the importance rating is likely to also increase. Czech Republic (r = -.730), Finland (r = -.750), and Luxembourg (r = -.690) all show strong negative correlations, indicating that if ODA budgets go up, the importance rates seem to go down in these countries.

For some countries, we observe that as ODA spending goes up, the number of people who are more doubtful about development spending goes up as well. This effect seems to be present for Luxembourg, for example. In the Czech Republic, another interesting pattern can be detected, namely that if ODA spending goes up, this is positively correlated with not (very) important (r = .730). Exploratory lagged correlations for the relationship between ODA spending and public support are reported in Table E.4 in Annex E and should be interpreted with caution.

For the relationship between awareness spending and public support, the pooled analysis likewise showed only a weak positive relationship. When looking at individual countries, most correlations remain relatively weak, although there are some notable exceptions (see Annex Table E.5). Germany (r = .790) shows a relatively strong positive correlation, indicating that when awareness spending budgets go up in Germany, importance rates tend to increase. For Austria (r = -.75), on the other hand, there is a relatively strong negative correlation, indicating that when awareness spending budgets go up in Austria, importance rates tend to decrease. The original interpretation is that if more is spent on awareness, more people seem to find development aid less important. For Austria, the exploratory lagged correlation is moderately positive (r = .410), in contrast to the negative contemporaneous correlation (see Annex Table E.6).

4.3 Bringing the findings together

The analyses above, together with the country typology presented in Part I, provide two different perspectives on how investment and public support come together. The country typology groups countries according to their average levels of ODA, awareness spending and public support, whereas the correlation analysis examines whether these variables move together over time. To bring these findings together, we consider whether countries with similar overall configurations also exhibit similar relationships between awareness spending and public support.

To facilitate this comparison, countries were divided into three groups based on the strength and direction of the country-level correlation between awareness spending and overall importance[9]: positive correlation (r > 0.2), weak or no correlation (-0.2 ≤ r ≤ 0.2), and negative correlation (r < -0.2), as shown in Table 5.

The positive-correlation group consists of Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Across these countries, the average correlation between overall importance and awareness spending is 0.448, indicating a moderately positive relationship. In other words, higher levels of awareness spending tend to be associated with higher levels of perceived importance.

[9] Overall importance is the sum of the answer categories 'fairly important' and 'very important'. For the correlation analyses, these categories were combined into a single measure to make the results easier to interpret and the patterns across countries more readily comparable.

Italy, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and Luxembourg form the weak- or no-correlation group. The average correlation for this group is 0.061, suggesting that there is little systematic relationship between awareness spending and perceived importance in these countries. Finally, Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Spain form the negative-correlation group, with an average correlation of −0.439. This indicates a moderately negative relationship, meaning that higher awareness spending tends to be associated with lower levels of perceived importance, or vice versa.

This classification highlights substantial cross-country differences in the relationship between awareness spending and public opinion. Comparing these correlation-based groups with the K-means country typology presented in Part I shows that the two classifications only partially overlap. For example, Denmark and the Netherlands are classified as high-investment, high-support countries in the K-means analysis and also display a positive relationship between awareness spending and perceived importance. However, Luxembourg and Sweden, which belong to the same high-investment, high-support cluster, show only a weak or negligible correlation between the two variables.

A similar pattern can be observed among the moderate-investment, high-support countries. Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom show positive correlations, whereas Italy shows little relationship and Finland and Spain display negative correlations. Among the low-investment, lower-support countries included in both analyses, Austria and Belgium show negative correlations, while the Czech Republic shows only a weak relationship.

Overall, the analysis does not provide evidence of a simple or uniform relationship between investment in awareness raising and public support for development cooperation. While the pooled relationships with public support are weak, the country-level analysis reveals substantial differences in both their strength and direction. Countries with similar overall configurations of investment and public support can therefore differ considerably in the relationship between awareness spending and public support. In some high-investment, high-support countries, awareness spending and public support are positively associated, whereas in others there is little or no relationship between them.

Looking across the three relationships examined in the correlation analysis also shows that awareness spending should not simply be regarded as a reflection of the size of a country's ODA budget: countries appear to make different policy choices about how much they invest in engaging and informing their citizens relative to their overall investment in development cooperation. Similarly, political commitment to development cooperation, as reflected in ODA spending, does not consistently move together with societal support.

Taken together, these findings point towards a strongly context-dependent relationship between investment in citizen engagement, political commitment to development cooperation and public support. The quantitative analysis cannot identify the mechanisms behind these differences, but it does indicate that neither awareness spending nor ODA levels alone are sufficient to explain levels of public support. This raises the question of what other factors within national contexts help shape and sustain public support, and how the role of citizen engagement differs between them.

Table 5: Grouping along correlations

Group	**Average correlation - overall importance & awareness spending**	**Countries**
Positive correlation ($r > 0.2$)	0.448	Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom
No/ weak correlation ($-0.2 \leq r \leq 0.2$)	0.061	Italy, Czech Republic, Sweden, Luxembourg
Negative correlation ($r < -0.2$)	−0.439	Austria, Belgium, Finland, Spain

In conclusion

The main empirical findings are summarised in 'Key insights at a glance' at the start of this report. Here, we return to the question that motivated this study: does it matter to invest in citizen engagement? The analysis does not provide a definitive answer, but it does challenge the expectation that greater investment in citizen engagement will consistently be accompanied by stronger or more positive public attitudes and engagement, as is often hoped and anticipated. Our findings suggest that this relationship is neither straightforward nor predictable: it does not work in the same way everywhere or at all times. This implies recognising that the outcomes of citizen engagement activities may be less predictable than we often hope and than funding systems tend to require.

We would therefore not do justice to these findings by translating them into clear-cut recommendations for policy and practice that present citizen engagement as a predictable route towards particular outcomes. Instead, the findings invite us to put the *why* of citizen engagement centre stage, followed by a critical and thoughtful consideration of the *how*. Is it primarily about creating public support for development cooperation policies and budgets, is it a means of being accountable to society, or about strengthening global citizenship, or about creating space for citizens to be informed, engaged and involved in debates about international cooperation?

From this perspective, citizen engagement deserves renewed consideration as a goal in itself and as part of the core business of development cooperation. Following this line of reasoning, citizen engagement should be approached as part of the role of governments and civil society organisations in shaping and carrying out development cooperation: informing citizens, being accountable to them and creating space for dialogue, rather than engaging them only in the expectation that this will lead to greater understanding, solidarity, support or engagement.

These dialogues may contribute to greater understanding, solidarity and support, and we should continue to work towards such outcomes and assess interventions in light of them. But as the study findings show, they should not be treated as results that can be assured.

Recognising citizen engagement as part of the core responsibilities of development cooperation becomes particularly important at a time when both the *why* and the *how* of development cooperation are changing rapidly and citizens need space not only to be informed about these changes, but also to question, contribute to and help shape them.

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Annexes

Annex A – Missing observations by country and indicator

Country	Missing years ODA	Missing awareness spending (starting from 1987)	Missing Eurobarometer
Austria	None	None	1987, 1991
Belgium	None	None	None
Czech Republic	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Denmark	None	1987	None
Estonia	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Finland	None	None	1987, 1991
France	None	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007	None
Germany	None	None	None
Greece	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023	None
Hungary	1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2018, 2022, 2023	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Iceland	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1995, 1996	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010	Not included
Ireland	None	2002, 2003	None
Italy	None	1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007	None
Latvia	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2023	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Lithuania	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Luxembourg	None	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995	None

Netherlands	None	1991, 1992, 1993	None
Norway	None	None	1987, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2019
Poland	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Portugal	None	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990	None
Slovakia	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Slovenia	1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011	1987, 1991, 1996, 2002
Spain	None	1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 2002	None
Sweden	None	1987, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995	1987, 1991
Switzerland	None	None	Not included
United Kingdom	None	None	None[10]

[10] For the United Kingdom, we have manually added up the numbers from Northern Ireland and Great Britain. This is because numbers published by GESIS and the Eurobarometer were not exactly the same, it is unclear why. For adding up these numbers, we have worked with the GESIS dataset.

Annex B – Spending trends with restricted country coverage



Figure B.1: Average spending development awareness per capita without countries only included after 2008



Figure B.2: Average ODA spending as % of GNI without countries only included after 1998

Annex C – Development awareness spending country by region



Figure C.1: Development awareness spending per capita per country, region North



Figure C.2: Development awareness spending per capita per country, region West



Figure C.3: Development awareness spending per capita per country, region South



Figure C.4: Development awareness spending per capita per country, region East

Annex D - ODA as percentage of GNI per country by region



Figure D.1: ODA as percentage of GNI per country, region North



Figure D.2: ODA as percentage of GNI per country, region West



Figure D.3: ODA as percentage of GNI per country, region South



Figure D.4: ODA as percentage of GNI per country, region East

Annex E – Additional correlation analyses

Table E.1: Overall correlations per importance category

Relationship	Correlation
ODA vs. Fairly Important	-0.278
Awareness vs. Fairly Important	-0.246
ODA vs. Very Important	0.102
Awareness vs. Very Important	0.040
ODA vs. Not Important	-0.130
Awareness vs. Not Important	-0.198

Table E.1a: Lagged effect overall correlations

Relationship	Correlation
ODA vs. Lagged (Very) Important	0.162
Awareness vs. Lagged (Very) Important	0.172
ODA vs. Lagged Fairly Important	-0.474
Awareness vs. Lagged Fairly Important	-0.325
ODA vs. Lagged Very Important	0.142
Awareness vs. Lagged Very Important	0.027
ODA vs. Lagged Not Important	-0.162
Awareness vs. Lagged Not Important	-0.172

Table E.2: Correlations between awareness spending and ODA

Country	Correlation
Austria	0.368
Belgium	-0.317
Czech Republic	0.325
Denmark	0.913
Finland	0.783
France	0.304
Germany	0.986
Ireland	0.491
Italy	0.201
Luxembourg	0.288
Netherlands	0.736
Portugal	-0.385
Spain	0.810
Sweden	0.009
United Kingdom	-0.260

Table E.3: Correlation ODA and importance per country

Country	(Very) Important[11]	Very important	Fairly important	Not (very) important
Austria	-0.264	-0.634	0.618	0.264
Belgium	-0.2	-0.174	0.082	0.199
Czech Republic	-0.729	-0.789	-0.342	0.729
Denmark	-0.140	0.151	-0.363	0.140
Finland	-0.745	-0.960	0.863	0.745
Germany	0.800	0.393	0.281	-0.800
Ireland	-0.240	-0.367	0.332	0.240
Italy	-0.546	-0.371	0.267	0.546
Luxembourg	-0.688	-0.706	0.561	0.688
Netherlands	-0.119	-0.113	0.098	0.119
Portugal	-0.165	0.429	-0.356	0.165
Spain	0.092	-0.288	0.411	-0.093
Sweden	0.214	-0.132	0.245	-0.214
United Kingdom	-0.373	-0.581	0.725	0.373

Table E.4: Lagged effect correlation ODA and importance per country

Country	Lagged (very) important	Lagged Very important	Lagged Fairly important	Lagged Not (very) important
Austria	-0.0635	0.146	-0.337	0.063
Belgium	0.0788	-0.357	0.370	-0.079
Czech Republic	-0.461	-0.595	-0.297	0.461
Denmark	0.681	0.854	-0.894	-0.681
Finland	-0.178	-0.534	0.530	0.178
Germany	0.953	0.350	0.060	-0.953
Ireland	-0.920	-0.490	0.106	0.920
Italy	-0.286	0.281	-0.522	0.286
Luxembourg	0.379	-0.034	0.138	-0.379
Netherlands	-0.506	-0.353	0.241	0.506
Portugal	0.385	0.474	-0.187	-0.385
Spain	-0.715	-0.424	0.280	0.715
Sweden	0.424	0.130	-0.047	-0.424
United Kingdom	-0.377	-0.711	0.818	0.377

Table E.5: Correlations between awareness spending and importance per country

Country	(Very) important	Very important	Fairly important	Not (very) important
Austria	-0.751	-0.812	0.465	0.751
Belgium	-0.363	0.846	-0.958	0.363
Czech Republic	0.040	-0.367	0.620	-0.040
Denmark	0.201	0.412	-0.533	-0.201
Finland	-0.348	-0.758	0.762	0.348
Germany	0.794	0.420	0.223	-0.794
Ireland	0.542	0.014	0.290	-0.542
Italy	0.151	-0.413	0.645	-0.151

[11] The variable (very) important is the sum of categories “very important” and “fairly important”.

Luxembourg	0.186	-0.188	0.286	-0.186
Netherlands	0.565	0.569	-0.526	-0.565
Portugal	0.314	0.032	0.158	-0.314
Spain	-0.300	-0.695	0.797	0.295
Sweden	-0.134	-0.221	0.236	0.134
United Kingdom	0.274	0.181	-0.100	-0.274

Table E.6: Lagged effect correlations between awareness spending and importance per country

Country	**Lagged (Very) important**	**Lagged Very important**	**Lagged Fairly important**	**Lagged Not (very) important**
Austria	0.410	0.391	-0.352	-0.410
Belgium	-0.599	0.442	-0.578	0.599
Czech Republic	-0.752	-0.844	-0.610	0.752
Denmark	0.745	0.947	-0.998	-0.745
Finland	-0.183	-0.437	0.421	0.183
Germany	0.860	0.091	0.309	-0.860
Ireland	-0.558	-0.840	0.497	0.558
Italy	0.961	-0.085	0.548	-0.961
Luxembourg	-0.716	-0.458	0.285	0.716
Netherlands	-0.163	-0.066	0.009	0.163
Portugal	-0.839	-0.086	-0.313	0.839
Spain	-0.974	-0.547	0.033	0.974
Sweden	-0.218	-0.351	0.379	0.218
United Kingdom	-0.646	-0.433	0.238	0.646